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ABSTRACT
The Sahel has gained attention in international politics as one of the central theatres 
in the war on terrorism. International actors in this war seek alliances with states 
in the region, reinforcing the latter’s military strength and their legitimacy from 
outside. At the same time, increasingly-connected young populations question 
the legitimacy of their states, and contest that legitimacy from within and below. 
In the absence of states delivering any reasonable form of social contract, young 
people become torn between different governing orders and find themselves 
in a liminal space. In this article we present the cases of youth in Mali and Chad, 
who find themselves in a period of re-definition of their position in society and 
hence search for legitimate structures representation. In this search they may 
frame their belonging in terms of ethnicity, religion or political opposition – and 
increasingly also in adherence to global citizenship. New information flows and 
connectivity among young people in these regions, and between them and the 
diaspora, has given a new turn to their search for citizenship/belonging and 
rightful representation. However, whether their search will be successful in this 
geopolitical context is questionable.
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Introduction
In the past five years, West and Central Africa have been the scene of popular 
sociopolitical movements that have contested the state. Movements such 
as Y-en-a-marre (Senegal), Filimbi and Luca (Democratic Republic of Congo) 
and Balai Citoyen (Burkina Faso) were successful to the extent that their 
actions forced their claims to at least become visible – and in the case of 
Senegal and Burkina Faso to oust the sitting presidents. These non-violent 
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movements have not developed into rebellious activity, but they have 
become a contesting force in society. The successful movements were able 
(at least temporarily) to ‘restore’ the relationship between the state and the 
population by renewing a social contract in which the population can expect 
a form of democratic citizenship.1 In Chad and Mali, youth movements also 
appeared on the political scene, but they have not yet resulted in concrete 
social change.
In this article, we analyse the situation in Mali and Chad as a liminal space 
where the youth is still in between different orders and contributing to ‘move-
ments in the making’. They not only contest the legitimacy of the state but also 
are confronted with alternative ‘orders’ in their region, to which they need to 
relate in one way or the other: such as the different orders organized by groups 
of jihadists in the case of northern Mali, or the global order in the form of military 
powers as in the case of urban Chad.2 We attempt to understand how young 
people come to question and contest what they see as the problematic legiti-
macy of their current states in relation to these other ‘orders’, and what kinds of 
alternatives they envision. With this focus, this article contributes to a description 
of the process of delegitimation of state authority and the search for alternative 
‘legitimacy-worthy orders’ within a field of different existing orders or emerging 
new ones. What order means in these contexts can be questioned, however, with 
regards to the violence produced by the various actors ‘establishing a certain 
order’. The process of delegitimation and the search for alternative legitimate 
actors – not from an insurgent’s point of view but from the perspective of the 
so-called constituency (the population, and in our case particularly the youth) – 
have so far received limited attention.3 This study also contributes to the study 
of how legitimacy comes about as a non-linear process4 – that is, how in youth’s 
search for alternative orders, the legitimation of non-state actors comes about 
in two particular corners of the Sahel, where large youth cohorts, authoritarian 
leaders, new access to information and communication technologies (ICTs) and 
international (military, political, religious and other) interventions have become 
driving factors in predominantly youth-led protests and movements.
The article is based on qualitative research and presents two examples: firstly, 
we present a case focussing on central Mali in which we attempt to understand 
why and how a group of nomadic Fulani youth came to sympathize with jihadist 
movements; and secondly, we present a case study of urban youth who are 
organizing protests in the streets of N’Djaména, the capital of Chad, to contest 
their government. We will first clarify our position in the youth and protest 
debate to arrive at an explanation of the factors that influence the contestation 
of government/state legitimacy by today’s youth in Africa – that is, the interre-
lations between authoritarian leadership, ICTs, international order and claims 
to citizenship rights. We then examine these factors for how they play out in 
the two case studies in the Sahel.
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Youth and protest in Africa
Africa is defined as a young continent, since youth (under 25) form more than 
60% of the population in countries such as Mali and Chad. Young people are 
both ‘makers’ and ‘breakers’ in African societies,5 but predominantly they are por-
trayed as breakers – feared for the disorder their number and their ideological 
choices might engender.6 Sommers7 confirms that the focus of these concerns 
is predominantly on male youth. The contribution of youth to ‘political’ protest 
movements is not new. Branch and Mampilly speak of a third wave of protest, 
acknowledging that ‘today’s uprisings build on a history of African protest that 
stretches back to the anti-colonial struggle’.8 However, new for the period in 
which the case studies of this article are situated is the sheer number of youth 
and the unprecedented access to ICT and social media in the countries 
 concerned. Combined with their experience of marginalization and exclusion, it 
might not be surprising that it is indeed in particular the younger generations 
that contest the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes on the continent by means 
of these technologies and media.9 While protests movements in the so-called 
third wave on the continent may indeed seem to share these factors (a high 
number of youths, increasing access to ICT and social media), at the same time 
these movements can be understood only in context and with reference to a 
large array of factors, and they may also develop in very different directions.10
Acknowledging the importance of historical and regional differences while 
identifying shared dynamics, in this article we compare two cases, from Mali 
and Chad. The shared factors that allow for an interesting comparison of the 
meaning and shape of youth dissent and search for alternative orders in the 
two countries are the following: first, the global discussions and local realities 
around security and the war on terrorism that have formed the dominant dis-
course about the Sahel in the past five years,11 which are a factor in the inter-
national legitimization of African regimes/states and in the de-legitimization of 
counter-state actors understood as terrorist movements; second, the increasing 
flows of information and possibilities to connect in the new era of ICT that have 
played an important role in the more intensive participation of youth in political 
actions and in developing their political consciousness worldwide12; and third, 
the emerging claims of alternative citizenship often informed by connectivity.13 
These three elements seem to be involved in young people’s quest for a new 
order – as was suggested by Iwilade, who examined the role of youth in recent 
Nigerian political developments:
[…] the intersection between youth protest, the pressures of a global system in 
crisis and the opportunities being provided by globalised social media has been 
critical not only to the deepening of resistance, but also to the ability of youth to 
appropriate the discourses and channel grievance. […] youth appropriation of 
protest discourses surrounding the pressures of the recent global crisis has forced 
a renegotiation of patterns of authority and control and is deepening stability 
challenges in different ways.14
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State apathy15 and authoritarianism towards the population, a reinforced 
legitimacy from outside (by international military and donor means) versus new 
means of information and connectivity form an undeniably potent cocktail for 
an emerging political consciousness among young people in countries and 
regions in Africa, leading to a potential crisis of legitimacy and provoking new 
and vital questions. By delegitimating their state’s authority, what alternative 
authorities do they recognize? And what do these orders, if available, deliver to 
their constituents? It is important to take seriously the concerns that underlie 
young people’s entanglement with counter-orders that question existing orders. 
Understanding their interpretation of state and rebel actors, as Finnström has 
discussed for young people in northern Uganda sympathizing with some points 
of the infamous LRA rebel group’s agenda, ‘can deepen the understanding of 
contemporary African societies in emerging global realities’.16
Looking at the crisis of state legitimacy from the perspective of youth in Chad 
and Mali, this article asks why these young people do or do not (yet) arrive at 
the creation of / or participation in a movement with the power to change the 
political system, such as did their ‘colleagues’ in Burkina Faso or Senegal. Our 
assumption is that in the geopolitical terrain that we sketched above, the room 
for manoeuvre of the youth seems to be limited. They are probably ‘crushed’ 
by states that call upon external legitimacy for their regimes.17 When external 
legitimacy is the norm, when authoritarian regimes are embraced by the inter-
national order, to what extent can youth movements that demand legitimate 
leadership in an age of increased political consciousness and use of social media 
be effective in contributing to social change?
Case studies
Methodology
The case studies and reflections in this article are part of the research project 
‘Connecting-in-times-of-duress’,18 a project oriented towards conflict-prone 
and authoritarian-led countries in West and Central Africa. One of our major 
methodologies was ‘following people’ in their movements and in their decisions 
over time, allowing us to reconstruct life histories. These life histories were con-
structed in context, a context in which connectivity and ICTs were increasingly 
present and a context that can be defined as one of authoritarian politics, in 
some cases war, and in all cases circumstances of oppression. The case studies 
we present are situated in central Mali and in the capital city of Chad, N’Djaména. 
In both regions, the first author has a long experience of conducting field work 
even before the most current research project began, allowing her to situate 
the collected life histories in a deeper time-frame. The second author has a more 
limited research experience in Chad and the Central African Republic, but more 
extensive experience with youth research in Uganda (from which case material is 
not used in this article). With time we saw young people in the region organizing 
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themselves politically in ways that question the legitimacy of their states. In 
this article, these developments are analysed in tandem with the growing use 
of ICT and social media, and in tandem with the increasing presence of the 
war on terror and of jihadist movements in the region. We bring together two 
case studies of predominantly male youth, acknowledging that the situations 
they find themselves in are dissimilar.19 While an experience of marginalization 
and exclusion may prevail in both contexts, the historical, political and cultural 
trajectories that brought these youth to where they are today are quite diverse.
Introduction of the case studies
Mali witnessed the outburst of violent conflict in 2012 after a period of relative 
democracy (from 1990 onwards). The northern and central part of Mali were 
occupied by the Tuareg, an ethnic group associated with nomadic pastoralism, 
who claim their own space in the northern part of Mali extending to Algeria 
and Niger, the so-called Azawad. It was not the first time the Tuareg laid claim 
to Azawad.20 This time their fight for autonomy was triggered by the fall of the 
Gadaffi regime in Libya, which created a power vacuum and led to an increase 
in the flows of arms and people into the Sahelian region. The rebellion was sub-
sequently taken over by jihadists.21 After the ‘liberation’ of the region in January 
2013 by a France-led operation (Operation Barkhane), the nomads had become 
aware of their power and the struggle to re-find a balance is ongoing up until 
the present.22 In this situation, new groups are aiming to claim new positions, 
and youth in particular play a crucial role. The case study below concentrates on 
nomadic youth in Mali through this turmoil and shows how their parents’ strug-
gle with the state in the past, and in the current disruption, led them to contest 
the legitimacy of the Malian state and the international order supporting it.
The Chadian case concerns urban youth who feel increasingly sidelined by 
the present-day regime of President Déby, who came to power through a rebel-
lion movement in 1990 that overthrew the authoritarian and dictatorial regime 
of Hissène Habré. Since then, democratic elections have been introduced, but 
they have never materialized into a transparent political system – and hence 
President Déby is still in power and reigns over the country in an authoritarian 
manner, using repression as one of the ruling tools.23 The elections of 10 April 
2016 and their aftermath were clearly another example of this reign. Although 
common sense dictated that the sitting president could not win the elections, 
Déby proclaimed himself the winner and was installed on 8 August. This felt like 
a defeat for the youth who were hoping for change in their country, which has 
been ruled over by dictators and experienced conflict since its independence. 
In urban N’Djaména, we followed the disenfranchised youth, who, instead of 
resigning themselves to their lot, increasingly protest against the regime despite 
its repressive measures.24 In the meantime, Chad became involved in the war on 
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terrorism as a military force, ousting Boko Haram from the region and becoming 
one of the principal forces in northern Mali.
Case study 1: Fulani youth (central Mali)25
In 2013 the Fulani nomads in central Mali (in Hayre-Seeno) separated them-
selves from their leaders, a unique gesture in a long history of domination. These 
elites, occupying leading positions in the Fulani chiefdoms, had always been 
the intermediaries between the nomads and the state. In 2012, during turmoil 
in northern Mali, this started to change when the Fulani nomads realized that 
neither their elites nor the state had ever really done anything for them. This 
positioning was certainly influenced by the presence of jihadist movements 
in their region. These movements preached about marginalization and, at the 
same time, provided protection where the state had fled the region. The nomads 
organized themselves (with the help of mobile phones) and united into a social 
movement (first meeting in November 2014), leading to a movement that 
re-defined their position vis-à-vis the Malian state and their own elites and 
voiced their feelings of marginalization. At first, they made an appeal to the state 
and international organizations to listen to their grievances, but the discussions 
they had in Bamako were not followed up with concrete measures to increase 
security in their region or to improve their living conditions. Subsequently, some 
members of the movement changed their tactics from peaceful negotiations to 
more violent protest. Especially, the youth became part of the jihadist groups 
which subsequently entered the region to fight for their cause. Today, these 
young men are seen as a threat, but neither their opinions nor their reasoning 
are heard – let alone understood. Can we decipher this development as a new 
claim to citizenship by the Fulani nomads?
Our research26 among the Fulani began in 1990 when the nomads who had 
just recovered from the droughts of the 1980s were again confronted with 
droughts. The development projects that entered their region never reached 
them but were appropriated by their elites27 (see De Bruijn and van Dijk 2005). 
Until then, the Muslim scholars that taught them knowledge of Islam were 
also from the elite groups of Fulani society. At the same time, influences of the 
modern world began to penetrate into the area. Vaccination of cattle became 
accepted among most of the nomads, they participated in cattle markets and 
they were incorporated into national politics (though always through their 
elites). The nomads were not united but rather operated individually along the 
lines of the lineages and hierarchies of their society.
In the 1990s this changed. Gradually, the nomads started to send their chil-
dren to school and some children entered into Muslim learning. Some of those 
children are now educated Muslim scholars. In addition, the nomads who had 
lost their cattle and were subsequently forced to make a living in towns opened 
the way for their fellow herdsmen who still owned cattle. Some nomads invested 
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in the towns and bought houses. A little later, in the beginning of the 2000s, the 
arrival of mobile telephony also touched the nomads, who became aware of this 
means of connectivity and linked up to their kin far away. For nomads who did 
not live in a town, this development began a few years later, but today they are 
all connected, and information and communication has changed their views.28
Thus, in 2012, when the Tuareg resistance re-emerged, followed by  jihadist 
movements’ hijacking of their agenda, the nomads were already engaged on 
an itinerary to change. The state retreated, the nomads were left on their own, 
and they developed into self-defence groups – partly at the request of the state, 
which could no longer maintain security in the region.29 One of the nomads’ 
major concerns was security. Especially, under the Tuareg rule that lasted 
until August 2012, security was inadequate. The jihadist groups managed to 
re-establish security and hence won the confidence of some of the Fulani nomads, 
who started to listen to the preaching of radical Islam – and especially to the 
narrative about nomads and marginalization – on their mobile phones and trans-
ferred files of sermons and videos to each other. They accessed a discourse that 
informed their disappointment in their elites and the state, who were the cause 
of their insecurity. Young Fulani men went to the camps of jihadist groups (which 
controlled the region from August 2012 to January 2013) to learn how to fight.30
Although the elders of the Fulani movement assured us that they were espe-
cially interested in better services from the state, the youth developed their 
own ideas into other directions. Today many of the youth are organized (based 
both on the organization of the self-defence groups and on the training they 
received in the camps) into counter-groups, who operate as small armed groups 
attacking the state in the person of police, military and political leaders. Some 
of these young men have embraced the sermons of a Fulani Muslim scholar, 
Hamadoun Koufa, reinforcing their discourse on marginalization.31
Hence, the Fulani nomads from the region have found a way to express their 
discontent with the state and with their elites (who are seen as part of the state) 
as the nomads’ legitimate representative, which in its turn feeds into a discourse 
of belonging and contestation that leads the youth into violent acts to achieve 
their goal. At present, central Mali is one of Mali’s most insecure regions. The 
Malian state accuses the Fulani of terrorist acts, but by framing their actions as 
such, the state ignores all grievances.32 We argue that the nomads’ acts con-
tested the legitimacy of the state from below. This is happening now because 
in the turmoil of the past five years the Fulani have appropriated a new position 
in society and have seen the examples of the Tuareg and jihadist movements. 
Their awareness – emancipation, if you wish – is developing in a triangle of 
factors: Fulani society and a long history of marginalization; access to new ICT; 
and the presence of war-on-terror dynamics in the region. This has proven to 
be a conjuncture in which ‘contestation of legitimacy from below’ has become 
a real force in society.
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Case study 2: Urban youth in N’Djaména (Chad)33
Is the situation of urban youth in N’Djaména, Chad, different from that of the 
Fulani youth in Mali? Chadian urban youth are confronted with multiple prob-
lems: high youth unemployment, low quality of education, continual strikes, 
oppressive government, very expensive and erratic Internet connectivity, gen-
eral economic crisis, etc. ‘Their’ Chad is ranked as one of the poorest countries in 
the world.34 These are conditions of life that they no longer accept, which makes 
their case indeed comparable to that of the Fulani youth, who also realize that 
the state does not really take care of them.
In 2016,35 President Déby of Chad and his regime faced serious protests by 
civilians. In October 2016, students were in the streets, burning a fonctionnaire’s 
car a day, a protest in reaction to the measures taken by the Déby regime, which 
no longer paid the students’ monthly allowances or the salaries (including the 
bonuses) of civil servants.36 The reason given was that there is no money in the 
state’s treasury because of the declining oil prices. The bankruptcy of the state 
was (and still is) extensively discussed in social media, and also by people in 
N’Djaména who suffer from the cuts made by the government to deal with the 
crisis. The situation rouses the anger of citizens who see how, on the other hand, 
the elites ‘eat’ their money, build huge houses and line their personal pockets. 
These sentiments, based on real observations, feed into the youth’s anger. This 
was especially so as this shortage in the state treasury was announced after the 
fraudulent re-election of the president in April 2016. According to the ‘angry’ 
youth, Déby had stolen the victory from their own opposition candidates. The 
four previous elections that Déby won (1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011) were equally 
criticized for ‘massive electoral irregularities’,37 but events leading up to the 2016 
elections, especially roused public anger and youth protests, which continued 
into 2017.38 One of the reactions of the government was to cut off access to 
the Internet and block the websites of bloggers, action groups, and so on. The 
Internet was made accessible again only in December 2016. Despite these meas-
ures, the youth managed to continue to connect online, and protests were also 
organized using SMS and simple voice technologies.
Nevertheless, Chad is hailed publicly for its involvement in the war on terror. It 
is seen as the only country with an army that is capable of fighting against Boko 
Haram in Nigeria and Cameroon, and against al-Qaeda in Mali. In June and July 
2015, attacks in N’Djaména were ascribed to Boko Haram and were interpreted 
as being a consequence of the involvement of Chad in the fight against terrorism. 
Although many of the youth doubted this interpretation, it allowed the govern-
ment to introduce harsh measures to fight against the perceived terrorist groups. 
The state launched razzias and arrested some young presumed jihadists.39 In the 
meantime, these measures and the explanation of the facts were countervailed 
by young social media users from Chad and the diaspora. At the end of January 
2016, President Déby was nevertheless nominated chair of the African Union, reaf-
firming his legitimacy as a president from a regional (i.e. an external) perspective.
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Today it is extremely difficult to be young and ambitious in Chad. There is no 
work, and the support of the international community is considered an insult by 
many young people, as this support is seen as uncritically supporting Déby.40 
Strikes by state officials lead to non-functioning hospitals, schools, universities 
and so on. And this is not the first time that strikes have paralysed the country. 
What future do the youth have?
These questions are part of discussions among the youth who express them-
selves in social media. Especially, the urban youth are well-connected online, 
and despite the ruptures in connectivity they find their ways around it and use 
VPN and other techniques to access Facebook and other social media in times 
of state-orchestrated disconnection. They access news and information that 
show them what possibilities there are in the world. The discrepancy between 
the possibilities at home and the possibilities ‘out there’ leads them to choose 
alternatives. They are clearly disappointed in the state and are moving gradually 
to other collectivities, such as churches, youth movements and protest move-
ments (which occasionally turn violent).41 Nevertheless, so far all civil society 
initiatives that have sprung up in recent years (i.e. Trop c’est trop, Iyina, Tournons 
la Page and le Movement l’Eveil Citoyen (MECI)) have seen very limited success 
and are often heavily repressed.42
Analysis: the context of contesting legitimacy
The young people who protest in the streets of N’Djaména or who join armed 
groups in Mali are considered disruptive by the governments of the territories 
in which they live. They are thought to create disorder, and hence are arrested, 
placed under control, and cut off from the Internet. The discourse of anti- 
terrorism and security measures legitimizes these actions of the governments. 
Meanwhile, demands from below for a better life and the right to work, to 
schooling and to access health services are ignored.
Claims to legitimacy, either by the government or by the ‘disgruntled’ youth 
creating and joining counter-state movements, must be understood in context. 
In both cases, and in general in the Sahelian area of West and Central Africa, 
these claims have become part of a wider context than the nation state. They 
include the international war on terror, increasing connectivity, and the related 
interpretation of global citizenship and the right to a decent life. These can 
be seen not only as context but also as resources from which contestation of 
legitimacy is formulated.
War on terrorism
The Sahelian area was seen as the new haven for al-Qaeda-affiliated groups 
since the early 2000s. It has subsequently become one of the regions for the 
military attention of the international players in the war against terrorism. Ellis 
788   M. DE BRUIJN AND J. BOTH
described how this development led to new forms of rent-seeking behaviour 
by a number of African governments, ‘by claiming that their enemies are radical 
Islamist’ and subsequently receiving ‘financial, military and diplomatic support’.43 
In a way this development has jeopardized state sovereignty and established 
a new power order in the region. For instance, the Malian state has lost control 
in the north of the country. Although MINUSMA, the UN mission in Mali, has 
no mandate to act without the consent of the Malian state, it is not clear who 
is really in charge. The state power was of course challenged by the movement 
of the Tuareg and later jihadist groups when they occupied the north of Mali, 
although international military force intends to control the area. As we have 
noted, full order has not yet been re-established, let alone an order considered 
legitimate by the inhabitants of the region.44
The interventions of the jihadist groups initially created a state within the 
state, since they took over the functions of state services, such as the provision 
of security and education of youth in camps in the north. Here, they were trained 
to engage in violent resistance against the state. With these actions, they defined 
a common order between themselves and the population in this area, as the 
example of the nomads has shown. The nomads shared both nomadism and 
religion with the jihadist groups. The later creation of the nomadic movement 
renewed claims on citizenship.
The Chadian case vis-à-vis the war on terror is different, but the outcome for 
the youth in the end is probably similar to that of the Fulani youth. The Chadian 
state has gained international recognition through its involvement in the war 
on terror and hence gained special legitimacy in the eyes of the international 
community. The training of its forces in close collaboration with the French army 
has been ongoing at least since 1986.45 Since 2008 new investments in military 
equipment have been Déby’s spending priority,46 and the contribution of the 
Chadian army to international missions has generally earned them respect in 
the eyes of their military partners.47 However, this international legitimacy is 
highly contested within the country, where the state is losing its legitimacy in 
the eyes of the youth, who contest election outcomes and the measures taken 
as a consequence of the financial shortfalls the state is facing. In the eyes of a 
large part of the population, the state is now seen as the creator of disorder, 
by creating inequality, co-opting people to become part of the ruling party, 
plundering state resources and not providing services or salaries for the com-
mon man. As noted above, young people seek to challenge the authoritarian 
order that masks this disorder, through strikes, protest movements in the streets 
and, more significantly, through sharing information and influencing the public 
sphere.48 However, with its increasing military might and the public display 
thereof that has been built up since 2008,49 the Chadian state is able to present 
itself as unconquerable and as ruthlessly repressive towards any serious civil 
society initiative.
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Connectivity and information
These realities are no longer observed only from below but have become filled 
with ‘facts’ that come through the Internet, social media and increasingly dense 
communication networks. The examples of sermons and videos that are sent 
through Bluetooth and reach also the illiterate nomad are numerous. The effect 
of these media messages is clear. They feed feelings of marginality and reinvig-
orate histories of duress among these people, who through the new contacts 
with nomadic leaders, political opposition and jihadist thinkers learn to interpret 
their situation as being marginalized and as one of victimhood, which reso-
nates with their experiences under an oppressive state. In the case of Mali, the 
nomads experienced this state, especially through the measures of the police 
and forest services. On the other hand, they were and are also confronted with 
the state’s absence: the failure to provide schools, to enforce regulations, to 
maintain security and so on. And under the conditions of the 2012 conflict and 
after, the nomads were not even heard by the international organizations who 
are in Mali for the re-creation of order. The feeling of deceit and neglect is deep. 
All these factors combine to cause information exchange to lead to new forms 
of identification and the realization of a shared fate.
The urban (relatively educated and literate) youth in N’Djaména feel that the 
state does not take their claims seriously; they even feel completely neglected. 
This feeling is reinforced by exchanges they have on the Internet, and also in 
the citizen journalism that they practise with posts in which they report on the 
misbehaviour of the state vis-à-vis the youth. It is important to consider here 
also the role of the Chadian diaspora. The diaspora and youth within Chad meet 
each other through online social media. Furthermore, the educated youth use 
the Internet to search for possibilities to develop; and in this search, they also 
come across alternative models for citizenship and can compare themselves 
to students in other parts of the world. That their world in N’Djaména is one of 
hopelessness is dawning upon them. What are their alternatives? Connectivity 
helps some to get out and to realize that inside the state there is not much hope.
In both cases, then, information and connectivity offer a double-edged new 
dimension to young people’s experiences and practices. On the one hand, they 
are fuelling political consciousness and empowering them to become organ-
ized, to voice their thoughts in the public sphere.50 On the other hand, the 
information passed through the same channels is also increasing awareness of 
youth’s situation, informing their marginality and adding to their frustration.51
Claims to alternative citizenship: New sociopolitical movements?
A consequence of these two factors is the search for other forms of belonging, 
for frames of reference that give meaning to one’s life and for a re-definition of 
what is ‘desirable, proper, appropriate’ (Suchman 1995: 574) within an alternative 
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construction of norms, values and beliefs – that is, for an order that is legitimate 
in one’s own eyes. The young nomads have opted to join armed groups, which 
for some resonate with the proud history of the Fulani and for others give mean-
ing to their acquired status as learned Muslim men. Both the pastoral nomadic 
existence and the lineage structure of the Fulani to which these youth belong(ed) 
are no longer a satisfying environment. Is their alternative a strict Muslim belief 
coupled with feelings of power as jihadist youth and fighters against the state? 
For them this has become a more legitimate claim and one of the ways of identi-
fication. Overall, the case of the Fulani nomads shows that the crisis of legitimacy 
is not restricted to the state or to the international actors active in the war on 
terror, but that traditional authority structures,52 for example, are also being con-
tested. The latter adds to the layering of problems of legitimacy and potentially 
increases the room for alternative orders to fill the existing void.
The urban youth in N’Djaména seek their own ways. Although many have 
distanced themselves from the state, few alternatives are available.53 Where can 
they go in such a contested urban environment, full as it is of contradictions? 
These young people have not yet found a real alternative: their protests are still 
a dialogue with the contested and detested state, with which they still engage 
with their expectations of decent citizenship: opportunities to study, freedom 
of speech, right to basic services, etc. They join discussions on Facebook that in 
some instances also lead to action on the ground; they protest in the streets at 
the risk of being injured or killed. What their future construction of belonging 
will be, however, is unclear. In their exchanges on the Internet and also among 
themselves, there is reference to a certain world style, to being part of a global 
youth. Indeed, this may be their future dream. Some of the protest singers, for 
instance, express their connection to this global youth and with their posts feed 
into this idea of belonging to an urban youth. However, it is unclear whether this 
can unite them into a coherent struggle for a better future within the bounda-
ries of the Chadian state. Can an alternative order be achieved, or is becoming 
a member of the diaspora the only way forward? If the latter is the case, they 
probably rely on an understanding of their plight by the external states that 
invest heavily in the military might of the Chadian Government. This leads to an 
awkward paradox for young people seeking alternative legitimate structures, in 
that they become caught up in deferring to actors who reinforce the Chadian 
state’s legitimacy.
Discussion
Ellis already warned that the Pan-Sahel Initiative and follow-up programmes 
to fight the war on terror in the Sahel could have an undesirable effect by rein-
forcing ‘failed states’ with poor human rights records. 54 Today powerful actors 
in the war on terror such as Chad are seen as an ideal ally of the US and France. 
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Whereas, throughout its post-independence history Chadian presidents have 
often benefited from essential support to stay in power, despite their ques-
tionable legitimacy,55 the current military means of Chad are unprecedented. 
At the same time, factors such as ICT and social media (as new and intensified 
information flows and mobilizing tools) make it increasingly possible to voice 
and organize dissent. It is at this juncture in contemporary West and Central 
Africa that we analyse the power play between African states reinforced by the 
war on terror, and the large cohorts of increasingly connected and marginalized 
youth in Mali and Chad.
As suggested, order, disorder, and (il)legitimacy are subjective constructs 
and need to be questioned in the context in which they are used by specific 
groups. If indeed the order of repression that has been the norm in some states 
for decades becomes increasingly and publicly questioned – due to the changes 
in access to ICT and social media that we have observed in our areas of study – 
then the ‘normal’ order no longer fits, and alternatives will be demanded. It is 
the youth groups that most actively challenge the existing frames of legitimacy 
and order related to their contexts in their own terms and with their own aspi-
rations in mind. At the other end of the power spectrum, we find countries and 
international bodies such as the UN, who attempt to (re)establish order.56 They 
often employ a narrow definition of the state – as an entity that is characterized 
predominantly by its ability to control and maintain order through the use of 
violence.57 For these players in the field, ‘state institutions […] are more account-
able to international standards than to their own population’.58 Jackson and 
Rosberg frame the opposition that emerges here as a conflict between internal 
legitimacy and international legitimacy.59 As we argue, the youth challenge the 
internal legitimacy of the states in which they live, while their efforts may be 
constrained by factors enforcing international legitimacy.
In their increasing awareness of their marginalization and social–economic 
exclusion, youth are ‘aiming to make political sense out of what is going on as 
they aspire to adulthood and citizenship’.60 Young people in sub-Saharan Africa 
are increasingly claiming influence in the public sphere through their use of 
social media,61 finding their own voice, criticizing authoritarian regimes and 
mobilizing themselves. Herrera and Iwilade see this as a generational charac-
teristic.62 They indicate that access to and familiarity with ICT and social media 
are able to steer youth’s political agency in new directions. However, based on 
experience in Egypt, Herrera is sceptical about the enduring impact of these 
new forms of political agency among youth.63
The quest for alternative citizenship and belonging is ironically more resolved 
for the Fulani youth in the Sahel than it is for the urban youth in N’Djaména. 
Those in N’Djaména find the means to protest and to express their deep col-
lective indignation, but at the same time they have no strong alternatives in a 
country with such a tightly controlling and internationally supported author-
itarian regime. In this sense, the international and national ‘order’ are much 
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stronger here than in Mali; therefore, the quest for citizenship and legitimate 
representation seems to position these youth in a tight deadlock and with lim-
ited space for alternatives. A warning note by Sommers (below), though taken 
from a more generalized context, highlights the larger dynamics behind what 
created this deadlock and the problem of terror in the Sahel in the first place: 
unintended reinforcement by outside actors of exclusive forms of governance.64 
This warning confronts us with a potentially cyclical problem of externally rein-
forced legitimacy and protest that involves not only the state machinery in these 
countries and their youthful populations, but increasingly lays bare the role of 
the outside world:
A starting point for donor nations is not to make unstable governance intention-
ally worse. While such a result is not intentional, supporting government policies 
and programs that make the lives of profoundly marginalized youth majorities 
even more marginal creates the risk of undermining government institutions and 
increasing frustration and despair within youthful populations. Such situations 
can threaten the credibility of states and foment instability. (Sommers 2011: 300, 
emphasis added)
In other words, we ask ourselves, can this vicious cycle be broken and what 
will be the role of young people in areas deeply affected by these dynamics, 
such as the Sahel? There is no doubt that young people in the Sahel are divided 
and do not form an easily comparable category across countries or the region, 
or, for example, across educational background, ethnicity or gender. In theory, 
however, they form a large constituency for parties looking to reinforce their 
support base and legitimacy; furthermore, the level of frustration and despair 
of these youth cohorts is high and seems to be increasingly on the rise in the 
region.
Conclusion
Legitimacy claims are defined in social and political communities that have an 
historical experience that feeds into the present. The youth we portrayed in 
this article, young men of nomadic origin in Mali and urban educated youth in 
N’Djaména, have the potential to form a community which shares similar con-
testing legitimacy claims. They do not feel protected or provided for by their 
states and hence search for other forms of belonging, contesting the state’s 
legitimacy from below, a process reinforced by their connectivity through ICT.
The state in turn has another reference for its legitimacy claims. In both cases, 
the state as an entity that controls violence is defined in relation to the inter-
national order in which the war on terror has become a guiding principle. This 
‘new’ order has placed new tools (or enforced earlier ones) in the hands of the 
state, to control its population and intimidate it by its newly acquired military 
means and security apparatus. It has also given an importance to these states 
that makes it impossible for the international order to deny their existence or 
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to protest against their ways of doing (external legitimacy). Hence, the police in 
Mali arrest Fulani young men, accusing them of being jihadists, and the police in 
N’Djaména shoot at protesters at will, under the pretext of targeting terrorists.
The triangular relation between ICT, the experience of repression and the 
appearance of alternative models of citizenship explains the search by these 
youths for a new positioning. However, the outcome of this process remains 
difficult to predict in the midst of these developments, and the overall picture 
does not look promising.
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